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Free To J--'ose: 
The Bright Side Of Economic Failure 
Harding University Team 
Wins National Honors 
The Harding University Economics Team, competing 
at the International Exposition of Students in Free 
Enterprise (SIFE), hosted by Holiday Inns, Inc. May 
19-21, 1986 in Memphis, Tennessee, was awarded a 
check for $3,500 and a National Runner-up trophy for 
their achievements. 
The 1986 team is composed of Stephanie Carter, co-
captain from Bentonville; Kevin Thompson, co-captain 
from San Diego, California; Melissa Brenneman from 
Spartanburg, South Carolina; Bruce Picker from 
Searcy, Arkansas; Joel Reed from New Haven, Indiana; 
and their sponsor, Dr. Don Diffine, professor of 
economics and director of the Belden Center for Private 
Enterprise Education. 
The Harding program entry was "Capitalism is In-
novative - It Made America." The Economics Team 
presentation described 68 projects and programs with 
14 on-campus and 44 civic, professional and educational 
groups in the mid-south. 
Harding Economics Team Projects receiving special 
mention were these: "Capital Day" launched to salute 
entrepreneurs; an "Important Economic Trivia" pro-
totype game; the "FREE MARKET CALENDAR -
A Daily Chronicle of Enterprise;" "All American 
Economics - Made in the U.S.A., a salute to Wal-
Mart's 'Buy American' Program;" Project "Hometown 
America;" Project "Chain Reaction;" "P.R.O.F.I.T." 
Theme Contest with Wal-Mart Associates; "Empresa" 
Program for Spanish-Speaking students; "Images in 
Free Enterprise" Contest in Visual Arts; and "What 
Does Johnny's Dad Do?" project. 
The national SIPE competition brought Tl regional 
winners together for two days of intensive competition. 
Fifty judges from business and industry across the 
United States evaluated each collegiate finalist. 
by 
Richard B. McKenzie, Visiting Professor 
Center for the Study of American Business 
Washington University 
St. Louis, Missouri 
Success is the professed goal of every economy, and the 
U.S. economy has had its successes. Those successes are 
vividly portrayed in statistical terms through the historical 
records of growth in gross national product, and in more 
human terms through the emancipation of many Americans 
from the grip of poverty and in the elevation of many others 
to riches. 
But failures are also endemic to the U.S. economy. A con-
tinual flow of news reports on bankruptcies, plant closings, 
layoffs, stock market slumps, industrial accidents, financial 
losses and persistent poverty makes the fact of pervasive 
failures indubitably clear. 
While there is no reliable data on the total number of an-
nual business failures in the United States, Dunn and 
Bradstreet reported more than 31,000 commercial and in-
dustrial businesses failed in the United States (one every 17 
minutes) last year. And the number of business failures dur-
ing that year and the previous two or three years was up 
dramatically from the level of the 1970s. Thousands of farms 
also went under last year, while tens of thousands more 
teetered on the brink of bankruptcy. 
The prevalence and consequences of economic failure are 
also reflected by the number of unemployed and dislocated 
workers. A rising trend in the number and percentage of 
unemployed American workers has emerged over the past two 
decades. Although the unemployment rate was falling in the 
mid-1980s, there were still more than 8 million Americans 
looking for jobs in the beginning of 1986. 
Between 1979 and January 1984, 11.5 million Americans 
experienced a period of unemployment because of "a plant 
closing, an employer ·going out of business, [or] a layoff 
from which ... (the worker in question) was not recalled." Over 
5 million of these workers had significant tenure (more than 
three years) at their jobs, causing them to be officially 
characterized as "dislocated." And a quarter of these 
dislocated workers were still looking for work in January 
1984. 
Unfortunately, it is all too easy to dwell on the dark side 
of economic forces - on the pain that people feel when af-
fected by business failures . Such pain is brought to life on 
the television screen when fired or laid-off workers, 
foreclosed farmers and the homeless are interviewed for night-
ly news programs. The emotional appeal for governmental 
remedies is indeed intense and compelling, so much so that 
policymakers can hardly overlook them. Confronted with the 
consequences of failures, they are frequently driven to "do 
something." 
"While failures may often be undeserved, unjust 
and unfair, the system 
that spawns them may still be just and fair. 
The purpose of this paper is to add balance to public discus-
sions of failure"s by emphasizing a frequently overlooked 
point: While failures may often be undeserved, unjust and 
unfair, the system that spawns them may still be just and fair. 
Democracies have a built-in political bias toward mitigating 
short-run failures and, in the process, creating long-run 
mischief. I make these points by first observing that many 
failures not only have a rational foundation but are often, but 
not always, expected by economic agents - private citizens 
(consumers and investors) and government policymakers. 
So while failures are avoided where possible, many failures 
remain unavoidable but still instructive. Indeed, failures often 
inspire future successes. Moreover, they are often a necessary 
side effect of success. That is the bright side of economic 
failure. 
The Economy of Failure 
The Failures of Scarcity 
Economists have long noted that because people's wants 
far outstrip their abilities to produce, choices involving the 
allocation of resources are unavoidable. That point, while 
patently obvious, is fundamental because it acknowledges that 
not all goods and services can be produced. Nor is it 
reasonable to expect that all goods currently produced will 
continue to be produced. Some producers will fail to secure 
the necessary resources to start production. Others, already 
in production, will fail to retain the resources they have. 
In other words, choice and the necessity of allocation make 
failure certain and unavoidable. However, it cannot be forgot-
ten that while some firms fail, others succeed. 
The prevalence of scarcity ensures the pervasiveness of 
failure. This is because of the pervasiveness of success -
that is, the ability of some to secure resources, at the same 
time, denies resources to others. Firms go bankrupt, factories 
close and workers are unemployed because strategic resources 
are reallocated to other more successful firms, factories and 
workers. 
Indeed, the failures of some increase the probability of suc-
cess for others. The failures release resources that can then 
be employed (at possibly lower resource prices) by the re-
maining competitors. The reduced supply of goods and ser-
vices can then be sold at higher prices and, thus, on more 
profitable terms. 
The growth in the number of business failures during the 
early 1980s is partially a product of the twin recessions, 
spawned in large measure by government policies to reduce 
inflation . However, many failures were also spurred by the 
emergence of new firms and the expansion of established 
ones. There has been substantial growth in new incorpora-
tions, although the number of new incorporations is only 
a rough measure of the emergence of new businesses. There 
were 600,000 businesses incorporated in 1983, more than 
twice the number of 1970. 
The businesses that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s caused 
the demise of others by driving up the price of resources to 
the point where some firms were no longer competitive. 
Relative Performance and Failures 
The economic source of failure is, in a world of scarcity, 
a matter of relative performance levels. The firms that fold 
may be well organized; the plants that close may be efficient; 
and the workers unemployed may be productive. 
The fundamental goal of every economy is presumably to 
produce the highest consumer satisfaction with the resources 
available. The process of failure is driven by peoples' efforts 
to get the most possible from these limited resources. 
Policymakers often lament the impact of imports on 
domestic production and relate imports to plant closures and 
unemployment. Textile and apparel trade restrictions, for ex-
ample, have been proposed on the proposition that expan-
ding imports caused the closure of as many as 250 textile 
and apparel plants between 1980 and 1985, robbing American 
textile and apparel workers in the United States of hundreds 
of thousands of jobs. From my research in this area , it ap-
pears that other American producers are, in effect, the com-
petitive culprit, at least in the textile industry. The firms in 
and out of the textile industry that were relatively more cost 
effective in production have expanded sales - the least effi-
cient firms and plants went out of business. 
While textile, apparel, and several other U.S. industries 
blame foreigners for many of their troubles, the industries 
have substantially "failed" in their competition with other 
domestic producers for control over available and limited 
resources. Other American producers have been, in effect , 
the competitive culprits because they are the ones that were 
relatively more successful in capturing the country's com-
parative advantage in production and in being able to export 
(and not face import competition) . 
Information and Failures 
The process of failure is greatly aggravated by the scarcity 
of one critically important resource - information. 
Knowledge on customer wants and competitors' plans is im-
precise and costly to obtain. 
The information problem is made more complex - and 
more subject to the constraints of scarcity - by the amount 
and kind of information that can help achieve success and 
avoid failure. Regrettably, such information is not readily ac-
cessible. Information on the availability of resources is widely 
scattered among thousands, if not millions, of people and must 
somehow be induced from its holders. It is influenced by the 
amount of resources applied to gathering information, i.e., 
the amount and quality of information obtained will depend 
greatly on its cost. 
Public policy "solutions" to failure may 
accomplish nothing more than 
reallocating resources - redistributing successes 
and failures. 
To say the absence of adequate information is a source of 
failures is to state the obvious, but such obvious points are 
often overlooked when policymakers consider remedies for 
failures, especially remedies that fail to address the informa-
tion problem. Moreover, there may be no solution to the in-
formation problem because key bits of competitive knowledge 
may not be available at any price. Public policy "solutions" 
to failure may accomplish nothing more than reallocating 
resources - redistributing successes and failures. Indeed, 
changing people's incentives to provide and acquire informa-
tion may aggravate the problem of failure. 
Much has been made of information problems inherent in 
a market economy. Since the multitude of market participants 
has only limited information, i.e., their own individual plans 
that are not coordinated with the plans of all others in the 
market, economic resources may be wasted. In a market 
economy, the left hand often does not know what the right 
hand is doing. Housing, for example, goes through boom and 
bust cycles because individual contractors, who are uncer-
tain of each other's plans, overbuild, causing precipitous price 
drops, bankruptcies and contractor failures. 
Many critics presume that centralizing the decision-making 
process would solve the information problem. Central plan-
ning of production may solve some information problems -
for example, how much is supplied - but it would not answer 
how much production consumers want. Furthermore, cen-
tral decision-making runs a~ok when attempting to allocate 
resources among available producers. 
One of the great virtues of markets is that they divide 
responsibility for obtaining and handling information among 
a host of market participants, especially information that can 
minimize the chance of failures. Centrally directed economic 
activity can impose superhuman demands on the limited 
capacity of planners to handle information. Increases in the 
complexity of production processes that may emerge with the 
integration of the world economy and with technological 
development only increase demands that would be imposed 
on planners. 
Risk, Uncertainty, and Rational Failures 
Information deficiencies ultimately translate into problems 
of risk and uncertainty about future economic events. Risk, 
which is grounded in probability, means that some ventures 
will not go as planned. That is to say, risk is a statement about 
the distribution of successes and failures over a series of ven-
tures. For example, 7 out of 10 restaurants will fail. The miss-
ing information is which ventures will succeed and which 
will fail, and the information is often missing because of its 
cost. 
Uncertainty, on the other hand, amounts to a lack of in-
formation about the distribution of outcomes - numbers of 
successes and failures. Uncertainty emerges because of lack 
of experience and difficulty in obtaining the requisite infor-
mation on the probability of successes or failures. The cost 
of information no doubt plays a role in establishing the degree 
of uncertainty. 
Risk and uncertainty ensure failures. Not everything can 
turn out right. Attempting to eliminate failure in the face of 
risk and uncertainty could be counterproductive because the 
costs of doing so probably would be higher than the costs 
endured through failures. In other words, in spite of the 
undesirable results of failure - closed plants, unemployed 
workers and erosion of a local economic base - the costs 
of protecting against failure - slower economic growth, a 
retarded pace of innovation, and lack of international com-
petitiveness - may be far greater in the long run. 
In its raw form, risk and uncertainty imply that many 
failures are no less founded in rational planning than are pro-
duction and consumption decisions that do not always match 
expectations. Less than perfectly suitable goods and services 
are produced because the benefits of improving them would 
not be worth the cost. Plants close because the cost of preven-
ting their closure through the acquisition of more market in-
formation is greater than the costs associated with a shutdown. 
In each instance of failure, an economic cost exists, of 
course; and as with any other cost, the cost of failure would 
preferably be reduced, if not totally avoided. However, most 
failures are not isolated ventures but are part and parcel of 
a whole complex of ventures, all of which combined have 
some risk and uncertainty of not working out as planned. 
Risky and uncertain ventures typically carry the greatest 
rewards, partially to overcome the costs associated with failure 
and partially to compensate for people's natural or learned 
inclination to avoid risky and uncertain outcomes. (In the 
jargon of economists, many people are "risk averse.") If an 
outcome is more risky and uncertain, the reward tends to be 
greater. 
We can draw an analogy with the stock market investor 
who understands that the purchase of stocks entails risk and 
uncertainty along with the prospect of rewards. An investor 
typically assembles several different stocks in a portfolio, 
understanding that one or more of his purchases occasional-
ly, perhaps even frequently, will not appreciate in value as 
he or she expected. The investor evaluates the selections by 
how the entire portfolio does on balance. In this sense, failure 
is planned, expected and even sought. 
Firm managers and workers typically 
deal with risk and uncertainty through 
what amounts to "portfolios" of activities. 
To ensure that no stock ever fails is a prescription for a 
less desirable return on the portfolio of stocks. However, 
because expected income is increased through the develop-
ment of a portfolio of stocks, the investor is better able to 
buy more stock - in turn suffering additional failures but 
also realizing greater successes. 
Firm managers and workers typically deal with risk and 
uncertainty through what amounts to "portfolios" of activities. 
Managers develop a variety of products and run several plants 
knowing that some plants will have to be closed. In effect, 
they develop portfolios of products and plants and plan for 
failures, although they simultaneously will do what they can 
(or what is economically reasonable) to avoid these failures. 
By developing portfolios, managers expect to increase their 
production incomes on balance. Their ability to spread risks 
and increase their firm's income means more products will 
be developed and more plants opened. But it also means a 
greater number of failures, although the failure rate may be 
reduced through greater experience with more products and 
plants and through a greater capacity to absorb the costs of 
avoiding failure. 
Workers and consumers also engage in "portfolio manage-
ment." Workers often develop a variety of skills ( or keep their 
skills general, applicable to many different work en-
vironments) and engage in a variety of activities, one of which 
is a job. They understand that through time and over the 
course of many activities and jobs, they will at times fail -
become unemployed or find their skills and abilities of less 
value than planned. 
Many consumers also buy appliances that they know are 
not "top of the line" and will occasionally fail. They buy 
what they do in anticipation that their portfolios will yield 
them a greater net return than if they bought more expensive 
appliances with a lower chance of failure. The important point 
is that in spite of the failures, consumers and workers manage 
their portfolios with the intent of raising their incomes. 
Learning from Failures 
It is all too ea'sy to think solely of failure as tragedy. After 
all, we do expend considerable energy seeking to avoid in-
dividual failures. 
Yet failures can be highly instructive and productive. They 
help, perhaps more than successes, to outline the bounds of 
profitable and productive economic acitivity. Failures instruct 
those who fail on what they should not do the next time, if 
there is a next time. More importantly, they tell others in the 
market what was done wrong and what will have to be done 
to become and/or remain successful. Economic failures are, 
thus, a critically important source of information. As such, 
they provide market participants with the necessary incen-
tives and disincentives (instructions) on what people, acting 
independently of one another, should and should not do. 
International competition and domestic deregulation may 
be sources of greater risk of failure for U.S. firms, but what 
American managers have learned in the process is that they 
must rethink management practices and investment strategies. 
As a result, the performance of the U.S. economy will likely 
show feedback effects in improved growth during the 1990s, 
if not sooner. 
The market system is a portfolio writ 
large: Over the course of many individual 
decisions and economic circumstances, 
the welfare of the vast majority of people 
will be enhanced through individual 
successes and failures. 
The market system is itself a portfolio writ large. One 
justification for free markets is that over time - and over 
the course of many individual decisions and economic cir-
cumstances - the welfare of the vast majority of people will, 
on balance, be enhanced through combinations of individual 
successes and failures. The pricing system is a critically im-
portant force in minimizing failures because it provides peo-
ple with necessary market information, coordinating in-
dividual activities by the well-known "invisible hand." 
The Justice of Failure 
Clearly, not all failures are just or fair. Some failures are 
the consequence of violations of contracts. Banks have fail-
ed because employees have embezzled funds. Real estate deals 
have failed because contractors did not build buildings as they 
said they would. And manufacturing plants have closed 
because supplies have not been delivered as promised or 
strategic employees did not fulfill their contracts. The injustice 
of these instances of failures are interesting because they 
represent behavior that violates the prevailing roles of 
economic behavior. 
However, many failures may be just in the sense that no 
previously agreed-upon rules have been violated. All con-
tracts may have been honored; all rules obeyed. The firms 
simply failed as a consequence of problems associated with 
scarcity, namely risk and uncertainty. Indeed, the failures may 
have been anticipated, and no loss of income may have 
resulted. 
Individual instances of failures, isolated from successes, 
may all appear to be unjust or unfair, but this does not mean 
that the system that led to the failures is unjust or unfair. 
Again, no previously agreed-upon rules may have been 
violated. In addition, failures may mirror an increase in in-
come for those who experience the failures. People may be 
hurt by their own failures, but they can be helped by their 
other successes and by the failures and successes of others 
that result in improved goods and services they buy. The result 
can be a greater income from a system that allows failures 
than one that deliberately attempts to contain them. The pro-
spects of greater income, in spite of the prospects of failures, 
can be the impetus for the consent of those within the system. 
Still, not everyone is likely to gain from a market system 
that permits unchecked failures. There will be those who fail 
at everything or practically everything and end up as net losers 
from the system. The question of whether net losers should 
be helped by public means is a difficult question, one that 
cannot be fully treated here. Participants may agree to a 
system that allows for some compensation to be paid to the 
losers, thus maintaining the necessary public support for the 
market system. Under those circumstances, it is particularly 
hard to see how the system could be viewed as unjust. 
The Samaritan's Dilemma 
Those who seem to object to public efforts to help 
businesses that go bankrupt, farmers whose farms are sold 
at auction and workers who experience involuntary unemploy-
ment are often viewed as unfeeling - unable to empathize 
with the economic difficulties, encountered by others. 
However, differences on what should be done to remedy 
failures arise even among those who care. This is because 
of the ever-present Samaritan's dilemma: Should those in need 
be helped by public means if it means future reliance on out-
side help? The answer is not so obvious as might be presumed. 
If public aid had no consequence beyond mitigating the 
adverse effects of failure, the debate would not be nearly so 
intense as it often is. However, as with failure, relief also has 
consequences. It can encourage the very problem that is the 
object of the public remedy. Relief can make failures more 
palatable and, thereby, more likely. It can reduce the tenden-
cy of a market economy to economize on failures and to learn 
from them. Hence, it does not follow that those who object 
to public remedies necessarily object to helping others. Ob-
jectors can be concerned about those future groups who will 
suffer from failures that are encouraged by policies adopted 
today. 
The more dynamic, venturesome and 
growth-oriented a market economy is, the 
more it will be fraught with failures. 
High levels of business bankruptcy 
are not the product of capitalism's failure 
but of its success. 
The more dynamic, venturesome and growth-oriented a 
market economy is, the more it will be fraught with failures. 
High levels of business bankruptcy are not the product of 
capitalism's failure but of its success. People undertake new 
enterprises because of the possibility of success. A policy of 
rewarding failure would inevitably require restricting new tru-
ly viable enterprises. 
As the late Joseph Schumpeter has reminded us, the 
paradox of capitalism is that it is most successful when most 
dynamic, and when most dynamic, it is most destructive. The 
large numbers of economic failures in the United States are 
an inevitable companion to the substantial expansion of sales, 
employment and profits in recent years. Perhaps the most con-
vincing evidence, then, of the bright side of economic failure 
is the invidious comparison of U.S. economic success to the 
economic performance of the more security-conscious na-
tions of Western Europe. 
Richard McKenzie is John M. Olin Visiting Professor at the Center for the Study of American Business, Washington 
University in St. Louis. He is on leave from Clemson University. This is a reprint of a CSAB Publication. 
